Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide

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More information about ebooks. Log In New account. Got to Shopping Cart. You screen resolution is to small to fit the content correctly. Does this mean that we are absolved of all claims to facts and objectivity? It means that in addition to representing the past in the present event, we must also critically analyse how any such representation is a process of change, a selection and the creation of itself with the past and the future. This analysis will necessarily be a form of experimentation, since there could be no template for the analysis.

This is because Deleuzes study of the third synthesis of time and of eternal return teaches us that every event is necessarily novel. It is not new in part, but new through every series of events drawn together in the present as dimension of an open future. So when the historian claims that the same anger or hatred is at work today as in the past, this is a profound misunderstanding of the affect and of the situations in which it is exercised.

Anger is never the same and every situation is different. Does this mean that we cannot compare and that we therefore exist only on minute isolated private islands locked in their times and spaces? It means exactly the opposite. We have to test the ways in which our anger is different, understand the ways in which situations have passed, experiment with the ways our own can change. We must hence also pay attention to identity, to sameness and to analogy, not for themselves, but as that which must perish through the work of the Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time new as pure difference.

The question How is our hatred the same? Deleuzes philosophy of time is therefore not only critical. It is revolutionary. It is not only revolutionary as a philosophy of time. It is a time of the necessity of revolution, not once, or in one place, but eternally and everywhere. The scars on your knuckles from the old water pump are beginning to heal.

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The rubber seals on its valves are perished. Early on, each attempt to draw water led to a nger-crushing blow, little usable water and curses of frustration. Now, your body has learnt to use a short, staccato pumping action. It preserves your hand and yields a reliable if acrid ow of water, as your arm stops short of the rusted metal on each down stroke. The body and brain have absorbed the earlier injuries and later experiments into a trained and automatic action. Failure and pain at the beginning of the week, muscle ache and cautious practice in the middle, have contracted into an unthinking movement, resistant even to your haste in thirst and sickness.

Like the sips on water with closed nasal passages warding off gagging on the metallic taste, a smooth and self-enclosed gesture pulls together a series of past processes, some deliberate and others unconscious, such that the current motion is a passive synthesis of earlier events. Habitual gestures such as these support Deleuzes claims about contraction in his account of the rst synthesis of time in chapter II of Difference and Repetition.

Following Humes account of habit and the role of imagination in drawing together different impressions, he insists on excluding understanding and memory from the contraction of the past in the present: It is above all not a memory, nor an operation of the understanding: the contraction is not a reection DRf, In conscious reection we pull images from Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time memory and analyse them with the understanding. In the experimental moments around the pump, memory of the blows, rapidity of stroke and record of scarred tissue were articulated with the concept of what the safe stroke might be.

Memory and understanding worked together as reection. You essayed the results of the combination of these faculties in slow motion, gradually speeding it up, until satised that water could be produced free of bloodletting. For Deleuze, there may well be reection in the preparation of habitual movements, but it is thanks to the imagination that those preparatory movements are nally contracted together into a movement going beyond each instant of reection and practice.

How though can Deleuze claim that the past is not synthesised by memory and understanding, since there can indeed be reection preparing for a trained movement or a novel act? Like engineers designing a water pump, you drew on memories or records of the past, allied them to a current state of understanding and designed a novel movement or apparatus. Does it matter that this can then lead, perhaps only in rare cases, to an automatic and unthinking passivity? This unconscious movement still rests on conscious activity and on records of memory just as much as a new pump design rests on the blueprints of earlier models and on textbooks on the forging of metal, water ow, elasticity of chemical compounds and mechanics of valve action.

Why is contraction not found in conscious memories or concepts, but rather in a passive movement guided by imagination? To answer the question, let us turn to the problem outlined in the opening passages of chapter II of Difference and Repetition and to the topic indicated by its title. First, Deleuze has set his account of the syntheses of time within a defence of repetition for itself, that is repetition understood not as the repetition of some thing the repetition is of, but rather the condition for repetition prior to any consideration of a repeated thing.

Under what conditions can we say that there is repetition? The obvious answer seems to be when we recognise that a thing has been repeated.

Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide by James

Yet this is the answer Deleuzes opening premise works against. The opening paragraphs of the second chapter raise a paradox for the answer: there is no repetition until a connection has been drawn between two things. When two things merely follow one another and no connection is made between them, they remain independent.

But repeated instances must be independent, by right Deleuze says, meaning analytically, since each thing could by denition just as well not be repeated. There is nothing in the thing that makes it necessary for it to be The rst synthesis of time repeated or be repeated in a particular way or series. Given any thing, we can conceive of a course of events where the thing ceases to be and is not open to repetition.

Many times we have expected a repetition and been disappointed when a part fails or resource runs dry. This raises another problem. From the outside there must be a difference between the repeated things for repetition to be registered, for without such a difference, there is only one and the same thing and not a repetition. This is a case of Deleuzes reliance on Leibnizs law or the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals:. The paradox of repetition is then that although it is dened as the repetition of something that is the same, it can only be the repetition of a difference for something that is not the repeated thing.

A downstroke of the pump followed by another is not a repetition, until the two are drawn together as in some way different from one another yet repeating nonetheless. Perhaps you notice a slightly increased ow of water, perhaps a little less resistance in the valve, perhaps you are counting the strokes: either way a difference underpins the repetition and that difference is not for one stroke or the other, but rather between the two and for you in the increase in ow or resistance.

So if you repeat the movement a third time, this is a repetition of the rst two thanks to your expectation of a difference in the coursing of water, or the effort in your arm muscles, or the sequence of numbers, all registered in your mind: Repetition but, exactly, we cannot yet talk of repetition changes nothing in the object, in the state of things AB.

On the other hand, a change takes place in the mind that contemplates: a difference, something new in the mind. When A appears, I now expect the appearance of B. DRf, This raises new questions. In our example, the difference could be seen as primarily in the increased ow, not in the mind, or only in the mind because it is also really in the ow. But Deleuze and Humes point is that this increase is itself independent of earlier and later moments until it is registered externally.

It is insufcient Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time for a conception of repetition until it is connected to the earlier moments in the contemplating mind. Another question is also raised by our example: could we not include the mind in things repeated, thereby returning repetition to the repetition of repeated things? The answer to this second objection is easier to detect than the rst. The inclusion of the mind in things repeated would merely lead to a regress and to the problem of what unites repeated instances in the mind, a problem Hume and Deleuze respond to through reference to the imagination and, as we shall see, Deleuze also responds to through the idea of the living present.

Two remarks allow for an understanding of the relevance of this work on repetition to Deleuzes philosophy of time. First, time is the formal case of the paradox of repetition. Any repetition is also a repetition of the instants identied with it. What draws repeated instants together such that we can speak of time as the synthesis of those instants, if these are in fact logically independent, if there is no necessary internal connection between them, or if, more properly, the very notion of repeated instants implies their independence?

Thus Deleuze is attempting to explain the relation of instants in time, without having to rest on an answer claiming that instants either somehow imply one another or are somehow contained in a larger entity that they are a subset of.

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The former possibility would be unsatisfactory for the reason given earlier about repetition: there is no analytical reason why any particular instant should necessarily be connected to any other. The latter fails because we would then have to explain how a property is shared by all instants such that they belong to this wider set, once again setting up a connection between them where there is none to be observed. The second remark is that Humes reference to the contemplating mind is only a special case of any contraction, rather than the original condition for any repetition.

Repetition does not require a mind, it requires a contraction. Repetition does not take place in time, but rather time or one of the syntheses of time, the rst one is a contraction: Properly speaking, [contraction] forms a synthesis of time DRf, This process is contraction. In the counter-example presented earlier, the response would therefore be that he is demonstrating the necessary contraction between The rst synthesis of time one ow and another such that there can be a subsequent judgement of increase between the two. For Deleuze, if we are to have an account of time resistant to the problem of the independence of the instants of time, that is, to the problem of what allows for the connection of those instants, then we must explain how they are brought together in repetition.

He calls this contraction an originary synthesis. It is important to distinguish this from an original synthesis. The contraction is not a ground for something else, or a rst, or prior, or essential synthesis. Rather it is originary in the sense of giving rise to time; time is made by contraction, it neither pre-exists it nor stands as a condition or container for it. In stating that contraction forms a synthesis, Deleuze is setting time as something formed by a process: a contraction.

The distinction drawn between original and originary will be important when we turn to the question of the relations of the three syntheses of time to each other.

Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time

The rst synthesis is originary in that it gives rise to a certain facet of time, but this does not imply that this facet is original or a rst foundation for the other syntheses. What, though, guarantees that this originary process cannot be an operation of the understanding and memory? Why in principle could we not give a formal account of all contractions as collections of memories, computed thanks to a given understanding, then leading to a particular action?

Why describe contraction as passive and the process of time as a passive synthesis? A further answer to these questions lies in Deleuzes description of this rst synthesis of time as the living present. The contraction of repetitions is a process that gives rise to the living present. Time unfolds thanks to this present, that is, past and future events meet in it, rather than remaining separate entities with no interdependence.

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In this living present, the past is constituted through a process of retention whereby past events are retained together in the lived present, for instance in the way a stroke at the water pump retains all the earlier attempts it has learnt from. The future is constituted through anticipation. Future events are synthesised by being anticipated, looked forward to or awaited in the living present, for instance, in the way a learning stroke in the present anticipates future strokes and improvements by driving towards them.

This leads Deleuze to make the claim that past and future are only dimensions of the living present with no existence distinct from their contraction in it. The future and past as living present become conditions for the past and future conceived as separate from the present, because without the living present they are not synthesised Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time and have no existence as a time that unfolds and coheres. By stretching the present into syntheses of past and future events, Deleuze thus goes beyond the traditional idea that past and future have to be thought from a present instant, the now.

It is here that we can detect a reason why the synthesis must be passive, since even if some aspects of the processes where the past and future are made can be traced to acts in the living present, these acts themselves depend on passive syntheses far exceeding what could be contained in any one calculation, understanding and set of memories set as conditions for them: [The synthesis] is not made by the mind, but is made in the contemplating mind, preceding all memories and all reections DRf, Deleuzes argument for passive synthesis in the living present is therefore an argument about the conditions for synthesis.

More precisely it is a deduction of the conditions for particular properties of past and future events in the living present as contraction involving a past and future dimension. An activity, the tensing of a muscle, say, must synthesise earlier movements and later ones. However, Deleuze is interested in a further question about the genesis of that act itself as retention and expectation. The conscious activity and its relation to memory do not contain all the movements, past and future, that it contracts: The living present therefore goes from past to future that it constitutes in time, that is as much from the particular to the general, from the particulars that it envelops in contraction, to the general that it develops in the eld of its expectation difference produced in the mind is generality itself, insofar as it forms a living rule of the future.

The particulars referred to in this passage are actual events in the past as contracted through retention. They are particular because they actually occur, as contracted in the living present. Thus, for instance, we could trace back a series of past movements leading to a given gesture. The future events though are not actualised. They are general possibilities not potentials. Moreover, as passive, they are general possibilities as yet not even conceived of in a mind, but rather set as a general condition for any forward momentum. The important step in the argument is then that any activity, dened as an action with a set of past memories enacted towards a set of The rst synthesis of time future possibilities, cannot include all the particulars and generalities that it retains and expects.

Along with Paul Pattons excellent translation, I have kept the French term attente as expectation here, but there are risks in this from the point of view of a restricted meaning of the term as expecting this or that in the sense of conceiving and intending this or that outcome. It could be better to use awaits rather than expects to give a sense of waiting free of restricted and particular conscious content.

As we shall see shortly, this option is supported by Deleuzes use of contemplation in the same paragraph. Many more particulars and generalities constitute a movement than its denition as an action can account for. Contemplation is therefore not a form of conscious consideration or aiming towards, but rather a form of unconscious receptivity. The active mind makes decisions upon actions, and though this action transfers from a set of past particulars to a set of future generalities, the mind is itself operated on by greater retentions and generalities.

As such, even in activity the present is contemplation, that is, passive absorption and transformation of retained particulars beyond the set considered in an action. The argument here has many implications. Deleuzes point is that passive contemplation is presupposed by action, since the particular and general selections made by action not only presuppose wider sets they are cut out from, but, more signicantly, they are also effects of those sets.

What this means is that any action is also a passive retention and expectation, for instance, in terms of conscious action, through unconscious and unconsidered effects, as well as possible yet non-conceived general outcomes. Conscious activity is only a case of action in Deleuzes argument and denitions. Although his study is framed around the human mind given its context in Humes work on the imagination, the distinction between activity and passivity does not turn on a distinction drawn between human activity and passivity.

On the contrary, passivity and activity are distinguished as processes where passivity is a form of retention and of expectation that is not related through a process selecting particular past events and associating them with a restricted number of general outcomes. This latter process is activity, but passivity is the wider condition for any active process. Passivity cannot itself be an active process, that is, it cannot be determined as a restricted operation from past to future.

Conscious calculation is a sub-case of activity. Human passive contemplation is a sub-case of contemplation. A mechanical computation of the best pump design from a group of designs for a particular ow of water Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time given a particular power source is thereby also a form of activity. Perhaps more surprisingly, it also presupposes and is the effect of a form of passivity, whose many types include malfunction under certain conditions, non-computed variations in ows, wear, faulty interaction with other machines and so on.

This explains Deleuzes distinction drawn between a passive synthesis and an active one in the mind. A passive synthesis happens in the mind, in the sense that retention and expectation as determined according to paths through particulars and generalities meet in the mind and transfer from past to future.

Active synthesis is operated by the mind, made by the mind, in the sense where a property of the mind fully determines the selection of particular parts of the past and possible outcomes. Note, though, that this determination could equally be a property of an algorithm, chemical genetic process or computer program and these count perfectly well as active, rather than passive. This puts us in a position to think again about the denition and role of the living present in Deleuzes work. We now know that it determines time as a contraction of the past and of the present, but in different ways.

Particular past events are contracted into an individual contemplation that is passive rather than active. General future possibilities are pregured according to this contemplation and an expectation or awaiting. The living present is therefore a process ascribing an arrow to time, from past to future, through the asymmetric nature of the two processes. Why does the arrow move in this direction? Why cant it go from future to past? It is because once the future is dened as the process of expectation, there is no general series of possibilities until we have a process of retention of particulars that then allow for generalisation.

The passage is from particular to general and not the reverse: Passive synthesis, or contraction, is essentially asymmetrical: it goes from past to future in the present, thus from the particular to the general, and thus orientates the arrow of time DRf, Without the prior process of retention we would have no general outcomes for a waiting to tend towards.

Given general outcomes do not move towards given retained particulars because then there would be no expectation, notion of the possible, or fan of probabilities, but instead a xed, though open set of past particulars. Asymmetry, a key term in Difference and Repetition, therefore here refers to the essential difference between particulars and generalities, where the former are actual and retained and transformed in the present and the latter are possible and expected in the present. There is no symmetry between the two because any The rst synthesis of time set of particulars determines a much wider set of generalities, yet also, any given set of generalities neither determines nor includes a set of particulars.

It is not a psychological term in Deleuze, as in a psychological state of retention and one of expectation. Instead, both are general and base processes that can take place in many different entities human, animal, vegetable and mineral, mind, computer, biological system. The rst synthesis of time is therefore a very pure denition of the present as process, distinct from the present as present instant for consciousness and from the present as one of three distinct parts of time past, present and future. Instead, the synthesis draws past and future into the present as two different processes related together in the living present, that is, a process that passes from the retention of the past into the expectation of the future, not as psychological, nor as phenomenological in the sense of qualities of intention , but as formal processes bearing on different things particular and general and setting them into relation.

Thus, in the living present, we nd Deleuze coining a new usage of the term subject, where the subject is no longer the subject of an action, nor therefore the human subject, but rather a passive subject, that is, the subject of a determination that is itself not the active decider or self-sufcient principle for this determination but rather the transformer between past particulars and future generalities explaining this determination through processes exceeding it and that it is passive to: Time is subjective, but it is essentially the subjectivity of a passive subject DRf, In other words, time is a determination of wider sets and is therefore subjective in relation to an individual determination, but no nal explanation or principle of that determination can be found in a particular actor in that process; instead, the central actor the living present is itself a passivity and effect of wider processes.

To sum up the argument for the necessity of the living present: it is necessary because in any repetition the repeated terms have no connection until they are synthesised.

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This synthesis takes place as the rst synthesis of time, that is, as the way past particular events reciprocally determine future general ones asymmetrically, or determine each other in fundamentally different ways. Here, to determine means to establish relations through a selection. For instance, when we select a given gesture as the right way to avoid crushing our knuckles on a broken pump we select a path through earlier gestures, which ones are to be repeated, which not, and we Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time select a set of possibilities in terms of expected outcomes, what we expect to happen, what we do not.

Determination is therefore a relating and bringing of order and priority: out of a chaos of unrelated particulars, paths are selected. These paths then allow for the setting of an order and existence of possible general expected outcomes, while the expected outcomes allow for the setting of the path but not the existence of the particulars hence the asymmetry and the arrow of time.

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Put very starkly, there is no repetition, no relation between actual events and possible events, and no relation between instants, without the living present. This is a very strong condition in Deleuzes philosophy, to the point where when we spoke of synthesis being external to its terms, this was a question built on a presupposition that Deleuzes philosophy only allows for hypothetically: that repeated things exist outside their synthesis. In fact, empirically we only encounter relations and speculatively we assume that this will always be the case. These are questions of philosophical method.

They can be traced in the closing remarks set out above through the appeal to empirical observation and to an as yet ill-dened term: synthesis. Deleuzes argument is explicitly empirical for the description of the processes of retention and expectation When A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all contracted ABs DRf, That processes of synthesis are required is not empirical. It is a logical deduction from the independence of instants. That the processes are conditions for one another in relations of asymmetrical determination is not empirical.

It is transcendental, in the sense of the deduction of necessary conditions across different realms in this case, from actual events to possibilities. However, that there are actual syntheses, rather than just hypothetical ones, is a matter of observation and, here, Deleuzes argument is open to difcult questions. Why depend on Humes distant observation, rather than contemporary scientic observations either psychological or in neurology? Why not turn to the resources of phenomenology, for instance, in Merleau-Pontys work on perception? The rst synthesis of time types of processes.

He passes rapidly from empirical remarks to speculative ones about the formal properties of processes and it is this passage that distinguishes his work from more thoroughly scientic empirical observation or phenomenological transcendental work. In the rst case, Deleuze is setting out a speculative formal frame on the basis of a sketchy empirical observation. This means that his empiricism combines this observation with the creative construction of a speculative philosophy with logical and transcendental moves, as we have seen. This partly explains the difculty of setting down a label for his philosophy: it is empirical, speculative and transcendental.

It also invites a deep worry, since there is a danger of failing in each of these moves and standing as poor unscientic empiricism, non-rigorous phenomenology and logically decient speculative philosophy. There is though a more hopeful counter to this worry. The best philosophy, that is, one that is not stuck with mistaken presuppositions about thoughts legitimate status as pure empiricism, phenomenology or speculation, might well be one that uses the resources of all three, on the basis of careful research on them through the history of philosophy, to avoid each ones tendency to impose a view of reality and of thought that is erroneous exactly because it excludes input from the others.

This combination of work on the history of philosophy, empirical observation, speculation, logical analysis and transcendental deduction can be followed in the third paragraph of chapter II of Difference and Repetition. There, having established the priority of passive synthesis and the living present, Deleuze works back through his arguments in a reading of Hume in order to show how the separation of instants and of particular past events and general possibilities cannot be conditions for the synthesis.

The synthesis is not a synthesis of separate things. On the contrary, synthesis is a condition for the conception of such separation but also for the demonstration of its incompleteness and secondary nature. That is why he starts the paragraph with this difcult statement: In considering repetition in the object, we remained short of the conditions that render an idea of repetition possible.

But in considering change in the subject, we are already beyond them, in the general form of difference DRf, What this means is that repetition cannot be thought of as either the repetition of objects, which explains why Deleuze presented such an approach as leading to a paradox, or as repetition in the subject, which explains why it would be a mistake to associate his reading of Hume with an interpretation of both philosophers as setting down the human mind Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time as the condition for repetition. The Patton translation of these two sentences is therefore somewhat misleading by giving en-dea as within, rather than short of, and by eliding the past tense that makes it clearer that Deleuze is commenting on his own opening paragraph and method.

The thesis that repetition escapes both objective and subjective study shows why Deleuze can appeal neither to brute empiricism, nor to simple phenomenology. This is because both involve presuppositions setting aside repetition and time for themselves. Yet this causes immense methodological problems, since how can we start a philosophical investigation without doing so either on objective or subjective grounds? As we have seen, Deleuze begins with a reection on the object but only in order to demonstrate that it leads to a paradoxical dead end when taken purely on its own terms: the object cannot be the ground for a denition of repetition because there is no necessity for repetition in the object alone.

For instance, even in an object dened apparently as requiring necessity, in a mass-produced circuit board where the mode of production seems to imply repetition, say, it is possible to envisage that the rst real suchlike object off the assembly line could also be the last when the quality inspection notices a fatal imperfection. Deleuzes speculative approach allied to his deduction of transcendental conditions is designed to take such paradoxes as productive for his philosophical thought.

As we have seen, he therefore proceeds from an observation of the failure of a grounding of repetition to the speculative explanation of such a failure in a prior synthesis in retention and expectation in the living present. This renders the appeal to the object itself speculative and justies its cursory nature. There is no need for anything more than a passing study of the object here because what counts is the formal deduction of the paradox, itself inherited from Hume.

The sentence after the statements on objects and subjects testies to the difculty of Deleuzes approach, but also to its inherent philosophical values of careful and tentative self-critical enquiry: And the ideal constitution of repetition implies a sort of retroactive movement between these two limits DRf, Repetition is not objective nor subjective but ideal, where ideal does not means of an idea in the human mind but rather of ideal relations as condition for actual differences as described in chapter IV of Difference and Repetition, The ideal synthesis of difference.

At this stage though, Deleuze is only able to indicate indirectly and metaphorically what The rst synthesis of time this synthesis might be as a sort of movement and weave. It is only four pages later in the French edition of the book that, as we shall see, Deleuze deduces this weave as two-fold relations of difference and of repetition as conditions for integrations and differentiations, as moves to the integral object and to a multiplicity of passive selves.

First, though, he proceeds to trace the oscillation between object and subject more precisely, this time not through a study of repetition in relation to the object, but rather in the subject. We have already seen how the subject involved is not the subject of an action. Now, he will show how synthesis as contraction cannot be identied, even after the fact, in memory or understanding in a subject.

Time and synthesis, as well as the living present, cannot be subjective in the sense of properties of the understanding or memory of a thinking subject. His demonstration of this focuses on Humes work on the imagination and draws out a number of key remarks and terms. These are signicant because they expand on an earlier puzzle. Deleuzes argument depends on the claim that grounding repetition on the subject involves presuppositions about the form of repetition, but unlike the work on the paradox in the objective approach, we have not seen how exactly.

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  4. That is what Deleuze will now show. According to his reading of Hume, memory, as represented conceptually, contains particular memories or represented events in their own distinct times and spaces; for example, my crushed hand on the pump two days ago as distinct from my healing hand on the pump yesterday. This memorised past can be distinguished from the past in retention in the living present because in the latter a series of events is synthesised such that they are inseparable.

    As we saw earlier, the past is concentrated in the living present and does not have a distinct existence. What is more, this concentration in retention must draw past events together because their reality is only through their retention as a series, which is itself a prior condition for any later separation of the series in memory.

    The same is true for anticipation, where the movement towards a concentrated series of fused general abstract events is separated by the understanding into a set of weighted distinct possibilities. This weighting is done through a scale of probability based on frequency of earlier separate events in memory where, in line with Humes work on probability as a solution to the problem of induction, something that is recorded many times in memory is given a higher probability. First, repetition implies three moments: a passing away of objective instants due to their unrepeatable Gilles Deleuzes Philosophy of Time nature a passing leading to the paradox of unrepeatable things ; passive synthesis in contraction; and reexive representation in active memory and understanding.

    Note that repetition implies all three such that it would be an error to say that it is only passive synthesis: a temptation that must be avoided because it dismembers Deleuzes model and locks it into a focus on a transcendental realm separated from an actual one of passing instants and incomplete represented objects and subjects. Throughout his career Deleuze developed a series of original philosophies of time and applied them successfully to many different fields. Yet the full import of this work has neither been fully studied nor used as a way of uniting Deleuze's philosophical and wider impact.

    James Williams presents Deleuze's philosophy as whole, and departs from other interpretations of his work by doing so through a most central and traditional concept in philosophy, that of time. Through this conceptual approach, the book covers all the main periods of Deleuze's philosophy, from the early studies of Hume, Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson and Spinoza, through the two great philosophical works, Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense, onto the Capitalism and Schizophrenia works with Guattari, then through to the influential studies of literature, film and painting.

    Relevant key essays will also be studied. This will be the first full interpretation of Deleuze's philosophy of time as well as an important reading of his philosophy as a whole. It will also be a significant contribution to the philosophy of time. Williams offers us a remarkable book -- not only has he produced a Critical Introduction to the famous and famously difficult three syntheses of time, he has also invested in its implications to show us its centrality as a 'process philosophy of time'.

    This book renews the meaning of Deleuze's early philosophy and invites the reader to rethink its relation to the promise of a new future in his later work with Guattari. Help Centre. My Wishlist Sign In Join. Be the first to write a review. Add to Wishlist. Ships in 7 to 10 business days.